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INTRODUCTION
Major League Baseball (MLB) is exempt from federal antitrust
regulation, an oddity that has earned it the title of a “true monop-
oly.”1 Baseball’s status in the eyes of the law is puzzling in a number
of ways. First, its exemption is a judicial creation that the Court has
never extended to any other professional sport or industry.2 Second,
the Supreme Court, despite having created the exemption in 1922,
has never ruled directly on its scope.3 Finally, lower courts have
applied the exemption inconsistently, leaving many commentators
to openly wonder whether the exemption even still exists, and if it
does, in what form.4 Despite repeated attempts by the courts, the
legislature, and the legal community to clarify the precise nature of
baseball’s antitrust exemption, the interaction of baseball and anti-
trust law remains very unsettled. 
Although there has been significant disagreement as to both the
breadth and validity of MLB’s antitrust exemption, those debates
are beyond the scope of this Note. The more interesting question, as
yet unanswered, is what effect the exemption has had on MLB’s
operations, and whether that effect is worth the costs of maintaining
the exemption. This Note asserts that MLB’s exemption is counter-
productive and bad for business, contrary to the belief of even those
who run MLB. The exemption, as currently applied and utilized,
exposes MLB to intervention from both Congress and the courts.5
MLB, in its zeal to protect its exemption, has unwittingly exposed
itself to pressures that no other professional sports league faces.
1. George McGlynn, Beyond the Dugout: Reassessing the Baseball Dream, in BASEBALL
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND THE NATIONAL PASTIME 187, 189
(Robert Elias ed., 2001).
2. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
3. Nathaniel Grow, Defining the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Framework for
Determining the Scope of Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
557, 560-61 (2010).
4. See, e.g., Joseph A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: It’s Going, Going …
Gone!, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1231, 1241-44 (1996); Martin M. Tomlinson, The Commissioner’s New
Clothes: The Myth of Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
255, 256 (2008). 
5. See infra Part III.B.
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At the same time, the impact of a policy change, initiated by
either Congress or the courts, is unlikely to have a material effect
on MLB’s structure or day-to-day business operations. Despite the
argument that revoking MLB’s exemption would leave it exposed to
antitrust violations,6 a thorough analysis of antitrust law, combined
with the standing precedent implicating professional sports,
indicates that almost all of MLB’s practices would survive such
scrutiny.7 This Note concludes that the exemption is largely, if not
completely, irrelevant to MLB’s operations. Prior arguments that
the exemption is irrelevant have based that conclusion on an overly
narrow reading of the trilogy of Supreme Court baseball cases.8
Instead, it is not the origins of the exemption that render it irrel-
evant, but rather its application and practical consequences. Other
scholarship has identified the implications of removing the exemp-
tion as to particular areas of MLB’s operation, such as franchise
relocation,9 but no commentator has examined how and why MLB
derives no benefit from its exemption. 
This Note briefly summarizes in Part I the history and develop-
ment of MLB’s exemption through an examination of the Supreme
Court’s trilogy of cases. Part II illustrates how the exemption is
largely irrelevant, in that MLB operates in the same manner as
other professional sports leagues by using collective bargaining to
sanction anticompetitive restraints. Part III discusses how the
exemption adversely affects MLB’s operations as a result of the
uncertainty and political pressures that accompany threats to re-
voke its exemption. Part IV explores the implications of a potential
policy change by applying antitrust regulation to the business of
baseball, specifically in terms of policies and structures most likely
to be deemed anticompetitive. Although a proper application of
antitrust regulation is unlikely to invalidate any of its operations,
6. See, e.g., Thomas J. Ostertag, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: Its History and
Continuing Importance, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 54, 67 (2004).
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See Mitchell Nathanson, The Irrelevance of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: A
Historical Review, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 5 (2005). 
9. E.g., Frank P. Scibilia, Baseball Franchise Stability and Consumer Welfare: An
Argument for Reaffirming Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption with Regard to Its Franchise
Relocation Rules, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 409, 467-68 (1996). 
2012] IN NAME ONLY 591
this examination highlights the tenuous nature of antitrust scrutiny
and the difficulties that MLB faces from a legal standpoint.
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST   
EXEMPTION
Baseball’s exemption from antitrust regulation is a judicially
created rule that Congress has never expressly codified or rejected.10
For that reason, any discussion regarding the subject must begin
with the three pivotal Supreme Court decisions that established and
affirmed the exemption.
A. Federal Baseball
Professional baseball in the United States began in earnest in
the nineteenth century. In the early years, there were a number of
leagues and associations, but as the game evolved, the two most
stable, dominant leagues were the National League and the
American League.11 Though they started as competitors, the leagues
merged in 1903 in an agreement that created the World Series, as
well as an array of other rules and regulations.12 This merged en-
tity, the precursor to MLB, agreed to insert a “reserve clause” into
the contract of every player, effectively allowing the franchise that
originally signed him to own that player’s rights indefinitely.13
The Federal League, another fledgling baseball league, tired of
competing with MLB and its reserve clause, suggested a merger.14
After seeing its merger attempt fail, the Federal League filed an
antitrust suit alleging MLB was in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.15 The parties came to a settlement agreement, but the
10. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 2. Congress’s sole legislative action was the passage
of the Curt Flood Act in 1998, which explicitly applied only to issues of major league
employment. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
11. See David L. Snyder, Anatomy of an Aberration: An Examination of the Attempts to
Apply Antitrust Law to Major League Baseball Through Flood v. Kuhn (1972), 4 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 179 (2008).
12. See id.
13. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 9-10.
14. See Grow, supra note 3, at 566. 
15. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prevents contracts
or combinations in restraint of trade of commerce among the states. Id.
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Baltimore franchise refused to sell and subsequently filed its own
antitrust suit.16 The trial court awarded the Baltimore franchise
$80,000 plus treble damages in the trial court, but the D.C. Circuit
reversed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.17 In a brief
opinion, Justice Holmes reasoned that offering baseball exhibitions
was a purely state affair and thus exempt from antitrust regulation,
as it was not commerce among the states.18
Although this decision is often criticized,19 it was actually a sound
analysis based on that Court’s understanding of the Commerce
Clause.20 Professional sports are undoubtedly interstate commerce
by today’s standards, and even by the standards set in the New Deal
Era, but in 1922 hosting baseball games was understood to be a
purely intrastate activity.21 It follows, then, that if this case were
simply from a different era of Commerce Clause analysis, the Court
would have changed course at its next opportunity. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, that opportunity was not taken.22
B. Toolson
The next baseball case to reach the Supreme Court involved a
much more direct challenge to the reserve clause. Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc. was one of three challenges heard by the Court,
each made by minor league players asserting that the reserve clause
was an antitrust violation.23 In a per curiam, one paragraph opinion,
the Court affirmed the judgment below on the basis of Federal
Baseball, while also noting that “Congress had no intention of
16. Grow, supra note 3, at 566. 
17. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
207-08 (1922).
18. Id. at 208-09. 
19. See, e.g., ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 58 (1998).
20. See Snyder, supra note 11, at 185.
21. See id.
22. Some commentators believe the exemption was almost overturned in Gardella v.
Chandler. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). In Gardella, the Second Circuit found that the game
had evolved to a point at which Federal Baseball could be reevaluated, but MLB responded
by settling with Gardella before the case went to trial on remand, thereby ensuring that the
exemption remained. See Snyder, supra note 11, at 189 (“The real significance of Gardella was
that it suggested that antitrust might be applied to professional baseball if the issue made it
back to the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
23. 346 U.S. 356 (1953); see Grow, supra note 3, at 569.
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including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal
antitrust laws.”24 Despite its brevity, in many ways, Toolson is the
most significant baseball case for two reasons. First, it passed on the
opportunity to reevaluate the Commerce Clause analysis of Federal
Baseball for the sake of stare decisis.25 More significantly, it explic-
itly stated that baseball was exempt from antitrust law on the basis
of congressional intent.26
Both justifications given by Toolson require further examination.
As part of its reasoning for upholding Federal Baseball, the Court
explained that MLB had relied on the exemption for over thirty
years.27 Yet that rationale is not very compelling when compared to
other Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as nearly every ruling of the
era overturned an earlier case on which the industry in question
had relied.28 The Court’s theory on the intent of Congress is
similarly unconvincing. As Justice Burton stated in his dissent,
neither the Sherman Act nor its legislative history illustrate any
intention of Congress to exempt baseball or any similar activity.29
Despite this flawed reasoning, Toolson retained, and probably
strengthened, the exemption. Further, the Court’s opinion demon-
strated that the exemption applied to the entire industry of pro-
fessional baseball, not solely to the reserve clause.30
C. Flood
The Court’s most recent treatment of MLB’s antitrust exemption,
Flood v. Kuhn, followed Toolson by upholding MLB’s exemption on
the strength of stare decisis and congressional inaction.31 Justice
Blackmun’s opinion referred to the exemption as an established
“aberration confined to baseball.”32 The opinion acknowledged the
24. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
25. Id. 
26. Id.; see also Snyder, supra note 11, at 191.
27. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. 
28. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-20 (1942).
29. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 364 (Burton, J., dissenting).
30. One theory of irrelevance posits that the trilogy decisions exempted only the reserve
clause, not the business of baseball. See, e.g., Nathanson, supra note 8, at 5. The Court’s
language in each of the three decisions suggests otherwise.
31. 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972).
32. Id. at 282.
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criticisms of the exemption—namely that MLB is clearly engaged in
interstate commerce—but resolved to let Congress deal with the
inconsistency, further citing failed legislation as justification for
why the Court should not step in and overrule precedent.33
Although Justice Blackmun’s opinion seems clear on its face, the
facts that gave rise to the dispute in Flood have caused difficulty
for lower courts when asked to apply the exemption. Flood, like
Toolson, dealt directly with MLB’s reserve clause.34 Curt Flood, an
all-star outfielder, was traded from the St. Louis Cardinals to the
Philadelphia Phillies.35 Flood protested the trade and asked to be
made a free agent; the request was denied.36 He then instituted an
antitrust suit, challenging the reserve clause and MLB’s exclusive
control over its players.37 Based on these facts, commentators have
commonly refrained that the Court’s opinions on the exemption
should be limited narrowly to include only the reserve clause.38
D. The Exemption Applied
Baseball’s favored legal status has faced nearly universal crit-
icism, both for how it was created and for its treatment at the
Supreme Court level.39 This atypical evolution has a practical effect
33. Id. at 283 (“Remedial legislation has been introduced repeatedly in Congress but none
has ever been enacted. The Court, accordingly, has concluded that Congress as yet has had
no intention to subject baseball’s reserve system to the reach of the antitrust statutes. This,
obviously, has been deemed to be something other than mere congressional silence and
passivity.”).
34. Id. at 259.
35. Id. at 264-65.
36. Id. at 265.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Kohm, supra note 4, at 1244 (“[I]t appears that the last of the Supreme Court
cases, Flood, held that baseball’s antitrust exemption was limited in its scope to the reserve
clause.”); Latour Rey Lafferty, The Tampa Bay Giants and the Continuing Vitality of Major
League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: A Review of Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F.
Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993), 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1271, 1278-79 (1994) (asserting the Flood
decision was a “narrow application of the rule of stare decisis” limited to the reserve clause
(quoting Flood, 407 U.S. at 276)). But see Grow, supra note 3, at 592-95 (arguing that Flood
exempted the business of providing baseball exhibitions, not solely the reserve clause).
39. See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 67 (“Marshall’s dissent [in Flood] skillfully
dissected the majority opinion—admittedly, not a very difficult task.”); Nathanson, supra note
8, at 2 (discussing how the exemption has become “fodder for commentators” and was “created
in an opinion, [Federal Baseball], that is generally considered to be one of Justice Holmes’s
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as well; lower courts have interpreted and applied the exemption
inconsistently.40 A handful of lower courts have held MLB’s exemp-
tion to be limited to the reserve clause, whereas other courts have
exempted the business of baseball in its entirety.41 This lack of a
consistent standard makes it difficult for MLB and its business
partners to rely on, or otherwise utilize, the supposed benefits of the
exemption.42
Perhaps the most telling indictment of the exemption is how the
Supreme Court has treated its trilogy in cases that do not implicate
the business of baseball. In the interim between Toolson and Flood,
the Court refused to extend professional baseball’s exemption to
other professional sports in spite of ample opportunity.43 Despite
sometimes creative legal theories,44 recent federal courts have
likewise been unwilling to grant a similar exemption to any other
professional sport. An informative example is the recent case of
American Needle, Inc. v. NFL.45
In American Needle, the National Football League (NFL) at-
tempted to use the “single entity defense” to escape antitrust
regulation on an exclusive licensing contract.46 The Court found that
because each of the thirty-two NFL franchises are independently
weakest” (footnote omitted)). 
40. Michael J. Mozes & Ben Glicksman, Adjusting the Stream? Analyzing Major League
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption After American Needle, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 265, 274
(2011). 
41. Compare Piazza v. MLB, 831 F. Supp. 420, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that baseball’s
exemption was not applicable to franchise relocation), with MLB v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp.
2d 1316, 1322 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (specifically refuting the argument that the exemption is
limited to the reserve clause and instead finding that the exemption applied to the business
of baseball, including franchise issues). 
42. See infra Part III.A.
43. See Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971); Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 447-
48 (1957); United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 241-42 (1955).
44. See, e.g., Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450 (arguing that “football has embraced the same
techniques which existed in baseball[,]” that the two sports “have no counterpart in other
businesses and that, therefore, they alone are outside the ambit of the Sherman Act”); see also
infra note 46 and accompanying text.
45. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
46. Id. at 2207. The single entity defense stands for the proposition that economic actors
with a “shared corporate consciousness” are to be treated as one entity, and thus cannot
conspire to engage in anticompetitive conduct, rendering the entities exempt from section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An
Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 742 (2010).
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owned, the league and its teams could not be treated as a single
entity.47 While this case has no direct effect on MLB and its oper-
ations, it is generally considered a signal of the Supreme Court’s
willingness to tackle antitrust issues in professional sports, and
possibly expand antitrust regulation beyond its current scope.48 On
the basis of that decision, it is reasonable to think that courts may
reconsider the propriety of MLB’s exemption. 
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL IRRELEVANCE OF THE EXEMPTION
It is clear that MLB’s leaders relish their position as the only
professional sports league with an antitrust exemption and that
they will take whatever steps necessary to protect the exemption.49
The question that inevitably arises, though, is why MLB’s man-
agement views maintaining the exemption as necessary to its
continued prosperity. There seems to be no evidence indicating that
an antitrust exemption is necessary to build a successful profes-
sional sports league. Neither the NFL nor the National Basketball
Association (NBA) have ever received antitrust protection, and both
leagues are flourishing.50 The NFL is the most popular and profit-
able professional sport in the United States, and some have argued
that baseball has fallen behind other professional sports in impor-
tance.51 With the success that other sports leagues have enjoyed, one
could easily wonder why MLB would even need an antitrust exemp-
tion to operate successfully; the simple answer is that an exemption
is unnecessary. 
47. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2215-17.
48. See Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 40, at 290. 
49. See Allan Selig, Major League Baseball and Its Antitrust Exemption, 4 SETON HALL
J.SPORT L. 277, 280-81, 285-86 (1994) (arguing that removal of baseball’s antitrust exemption
would not “better serve the public interest”).
50. See Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 40, at 277 (quoting Tomlinson, supra note 4, at
297).
51. See Matthew Futterman, Has Baseball’s Moment Passed?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2011,
at D11 (noting that the declining number of adolescents playing baseball has also negatively
impacted the MLB talent pool and fan base).
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A. The Impact of Labor Law
The biggest factor that has contributed to the declining impor-
tance and impact of MLB’s exemption is the increased role of labor
law within professional sports. Labor law plays a significant role in
all sports because of the unique balance between player and owner
interests.52 In this arena, baseball’s antitrust exemption is not
significant.53 When the National Labor Relations Board asserted
jurisdiction over baseball in 1973, the MLB’s antitrust exemption
faded in importance.54 The reason is that nearly all of MLB’s rules
and policies are collectively bargained for with the Major League
Baseball Players’ Association (MLBPA).55
An essential aspect of federal labor law is the nonstatutory labor
exemption, which allows the league and its union to agree on gov-
erning rules in collective bargaining agreements.56 The Supreme
Court has recognized that the nonstatutory labor exemption is
necessary to give effect to the policies of federal labor law, namely
incentivizing meaningful collective bargaining.57 In the labor con-
text, Congress has determined that collectively bargained-for prac-
tices are generally beyond the scope of judicial antitrust review.58
This policy decision is consistent with the purpose of antitrust reg-
ulation: to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.59
52. See William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on Baseball,
Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 61-62 (2004).
53. Cf. id. at 80-82 (discussing how labor law supersedes antitrust law for sports with or
without an exemption).
54. Id. at 66. 
55. See id. at 66-67 (“[T]he labor law framework was suited to the relationship between
players and owners[,] ... that baseball might seek antitrust immunity via the labor exemption
even if the broad antitrust exemption from Federal Baseball no longer applied.”).
56. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996) (“As a matter of logic, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to require groups of employers and employees to bargain
together, but at the same time to forbid them to make among themselves any of the
competition-restricting agreements potentially necessary to make the process work.”). 
57. See id. at 248-50 (confirming the applicability of the nonstatutory labor exemption to
professional sports leagues); see also Ostertag, supra note 6, at 65 (explaining how the
nonstatutory labor exemption is necessary because without it, all union negotiations could be
considered collusive).
58. Brown, 518 U.S. at 236-37.
59. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
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The reality is that every sport engages in certain anticompetitive
restraints, because it is the only way to make the league structure
work.60 Each of the major professional sports engage in conduct
that, apart from this labor exemption, would clearly be considered
anticompetitive. The simplest example would be the drafting of
amateur players. The MLB, NFL, and NBA each hold a draft in the
offseason in which teams select eligible players and retain their
rights for a certain period, ensuring that the player can negotiate
with only one team.61 The draft system is clearly a restraint on
trade,62 but because the players’ unions agree to these rules, they
are not susceptible to antitrust regulation.63 In addition to the draft,
there are many other league rules covered by the nonstatutory labor
exemption that would be unaffected by baseball losing its antitrust
exemption.64
MLB’s antitrust exemption is not particularly useful in labor
relations either. One might think that the strength of its antitrust
exemption would give owners superior leverage, as the lack of
decertification as an option would weaken the union’s position;65 but
in practice MLB’s labor situation has been chaotic.66 Though the
NFL and NBA have both recently gone through long labor disputes,
historically, MLB has the worst record on labor relations of any
professional sport. For example, prior to 2002, every collective bar-
gaining agreement resulted in either a strike or a lockout.67 Federal
60. See id. at 101.
61. See Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The Amateur Sports Draft: The Best Means to the End?, 6
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 1 (1995).
62. See id. To be eligible for free agency, and negotiate compensation on the open market,
players must incur a certain number of years of service time. In baseball, it is six years. See
Gould, supra note 52, at 69.
63. See Rosenthal, supra note 61, at 16, 18. 
64. Among the simplest examples are league rules as to on-field competition: the number
of games played in a season, divisional assignments, and rules regarding equipment. See, e.g.,
Walter Champion, Clarett v. NFL and the Reincarnation of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
in Professional Sports, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 587, 590-91 (2006) (quoting WALTER T. CHAMPION,
JR., SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 58 (3d ed. 2005)).
65. As a result of the nonstatutory labor exemption, professional athletes, as union
members, could file an antitrust suit on an issue implicated in collective bargaining only if
they decertified their union or another event triggered the elimination of the negotiation
process. See Gould, supra note 52, at 80-81.
66. See generally id. at 65-78 (discussing labor relations in baseball from the formation
of the Players Association in 1954 to the 2002 collective bargaining negotiations).
67. Id. at 62. 
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labor law supersedes antitrust regulation where collective bargain-
ing is involved,68 so in regard to many of MLB’s anticompetitive
restraints, this exemption is meaningless. The passage of the Curt
Flood Act in 1998 confirmed this development by guaranteeing
major league players the right to file an antitrust action on matters
regarding employment.69
B. Nature of Professional Sports
Courts have generally acknowledged that professional sports are
different than other industries because of their unique structure. In
Flood, the Court labored to recognize the “unique characteristics
and needs” of baseball.70 This recognition is not limited to baseball;
it applies to all sports organizations because without it, no sports
league could function.71 Courts will tolerate restrictions on competi-
tion when they benefit the consumer, and this view has been con-
sistently applied to cases involving professional sports.72 This means
that the courts would treat baseball, without an exemption, in much
the same manner as other sports. Its practices would be subject to
antitrust regulation, but they would be analyzed according to the
“rule of reason,” under which some restraints are tolerated.73 As
noted, other sports are flourishing without an exemption, so there
is no reason to believe baseball could not do the same.74
Upon review, it becomes clear that tolerating some restraints in
professional sports is justified.75 The leagues are economic outliers
68. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 242 (1996).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006). The Curt Flood Act is the only legislation directly implicating
MLB’s exemption. The Act, however, is very limited, explicitly stating that it does not change
the application of antitrust law to any other facet of baseball, including franchise issues and
the minor league system. Id. 
70. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
71. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (“[S]ome
activities can only be carried out jointly. Perhaps the leading example is league sports. When
a league of professional lacrosse teams is formed, it would be pointless to declare their
cooperation illegal.” (alteration in original) (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
278 (1978)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
72. Cf. Scibilia, supra note 9, at 435-36 (stating that courts, when applying antitrust law,
have stressed the market impact of the challenged practice).
73. See infra Part IV.A.
74. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
75. See infra Part IV.B.
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in that promoting unregulated competition would damage the
product and adversely affect the consumer.76 For those reasons, the
choices professional sports leagues and their franchises make are
treated differently under antitrust law.77 This is one of the many
reasons why the revocation of its exemption would not necessarily
have an impact on MLB’s practices. 
C. MLB Does Not Assert or Take Advantage of Its Exemption
The clearest indication that MLB’s antitrust exemption is irrel-
evant is the fact that MLB often chooses not to assert it. As sports
law professor Mitchell Nathanson has noted, “in an ironic effort to
prevent the Sherman Act from applying to it, MLB has voluntarily
abided by it.”78 This reluctance to assert the exemption can be
explained in one of two ways: either MLB does not want to overuse
the exemption in a way that might attract congressional review, or
MLB has concluded that its exemption does not actually produce
any material benefit. Neither explanation is helpful to MLB when
making operational decisions.
Several examples illustrate this point. Many commentators look
at franchise relocation and expansion as the principle area in which
MLB could use the exemption to its own benefit,79 yet since 1958,
MLB has expanded or relocated a team once every eight years.80
Commissioner Allan “Bud” Selig himself has argued that the ex-
emption allows MLB to avoid the “chaos and inefficiency” caused by
franchise relocation,81 but MLB has seen more movement of its
franchises than the NFL since 1950.82 MLB, presumably, could use
its exemption to prevent relocation, yet it has generally chosen not
to do so.
76. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216-17 (2010).
77. See id.
78. Nathanson, supra note 8, at 1.
79. See, e.g., Scibilia, supra note 9, at 443-44 (arguing that baseball’s exemption covers
franchise issues).
80. See Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 40, at 282-83.
81. Selig, supra note 49, at 281. But see Nathanson, supra note 8, at 23-24 (finding that
Selig’s assertions proved incorrect).
82. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 23-24.
2012] IN NAME ONLY 601
Even if MLB chose not to use the exemption in regard to franchise
issues, despite Selig’s stated policy to the contrary, one would think
MLB would use the exemption when other practices were chal-
lenged in court. Yet in a recent case involving its exclusive licensing
provider, MLB chose not to assert the exemption, instead moving for
summary judgment on the merits.83 The Second Circuit applied the
rule of reason analysis under the Sherman Act and found that the
petitioner had failed to show any evidence that MLB’s conduct
adversely affected competition.84 This outcome is important for two
reasons. First, it is an implicit acknowledgement by MLB that its
exemption is tenuous at best. Second, this decision is compelling
evidence that many of baseball’s practices would survive rule of
reason scrutiny.85
The obvious counterargument would be that MLB chose not to
assert its exemption because it was confident it could win on the
merits. A closer look at the case, however, reveals this to be un-
likely. The dispute in MLB Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. impli-
cated MLB’s licensing agent, Major League Baseball Properties
(MLBP), and an agreement among the thirty MLB teams to allow
MLBP to exclusively market and promote the logo of MLB and its
teams.86 The agreement gave MLBP the authority to choose the
prices for licenses attached to its merchandise.87 Although the court
found that this agreement did not constitute price fixing,88 it is hard
to find a compelling explanation for why MLB would take the
chance of arguing this point on the merits if it believed it could suc-
cessfully assert its exemption. The more reasoned conclusion is that
MLB feared asserting the exemption to no avail. Losing the exemp-
tion was much more of a risk to MLB than losing the case. 
MLB’s resistance to asserting its exemption demonstrates that
the exemption is primarily symbolic in nature. It allows MLB to say
it is the only professional sport to possess favored legal status but
brings little benefit in practical application. In other words, base-
83. MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 2008).
84. Id. at 334.
85. See infra notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
86. 542 F.3d at 295, 297.
87. See id. at 334-35 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 320 (majority opinion) (“[T]he so-called ‘price’ restriction is not in fact an
agreement on ‘price’ but rather an agreement for the sharing of profits.”).
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ball’s “antitrust exemption represents merely a difference without
a distinction.”89
III. HOW THE EXEMPTION HURTS BASEBALL
The benefits of MLB’s antitrust exemption do not outweigh the
costs of protecting it. As a result of its unique creation, the exemp-
tion is both cumbersome and uncertain. Not only has MLB’s exemp-
tion been rendered largely irrelevant, the exemption, ironically,
leaves MLB open to increased judicial and congressional scrutiny.
A. Cumbersome and Uncertain Nature of the Exemption
District courts asked to apply MLB’s antitrust exemption have
done so very inconsistently.90 These lower court decisions generally
fall into one of three categories: a narrow approach holding that the
exemption applies only to the reserve clause; a broad view that the
exemption covers nearly all aspects of the business of baseball; or a
middle ground approach based on Holmes’s view of the “unique
characteristics and needs” of baseball.91 What is important is not
which of these competing interpretations is most appropriate, but
rather that no consistent standard exists. 
This lack of consistency injects a great deal of uncertainty into
MLB’s business dealings. When MLB acts or engages in a business
transaction, neither it nor its business partner knows to what extent
the exemption applies. MLB’s proposed deal with DirecTV in 2007
is a prime example of how the exemption can materially hurt MLB’s
bottom line. 
MLB offers a service through cable and satellite providers in
which subscribing consumers can view out-of-market contests that
they ordinarily would not be able to see.92 Beginning in 2001, the
service was offered through both DirecTV and local cable providers,
but in January of 2007, MLB entered into a seven-year exclusive
89. Nathanson, supra note 8, at 21.
90. See Grow, supra note 3, at 580 (“[S]ubsequent lower courts nevertheless have failed
to develop a uniform framework consistent with the Court’s precedent.”). 
91. Id. at 580-81. 
92. See Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 307.
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agreement with DirecTV reportedly worth $700 million.93 After the
deal was announced, baseball fans reacted negatively to the pro-
posed agreement—so negatively that the United States Senate
became involved.94 Senator John Kerry immediately cast doubt on
the deal, asking the Federal Communications Commission to inves-
tigate.95 Senator Kerry then called committee hearings to examine
the deal, during which he strongly urged MLB to resume negotia-
tions with its cable partners.96
MLB, presumably fearful of how Congress would respond, gave in
to the pressure and entered into an agreement with the cable
providers,97 while at the same time renegotiating its DirecTV deal
for substantially less money.98 Had MLB decided to stand by its
original arrangement, Congress could have chosen to statutorily
remove MLB’s antitrust exemption or strip the protection afforded
by the Sports Broadcasting Act.99 MLB was apparently not willing
to risk its exemption for a favorable television contract, raising the
question as to when MLB is actually willing to assert its exemption.
B. Fear of Congressional and Judicial Intervention
The DirecTV episode was certainly not the first instance in which
Congress played a role in MLB’s operations. In fact, many of the
significant actions MLB has taken over its history have been
accompanied by the threat of congressional intervention or the
threat of an antitrust lawsuit. Whereas other professional sports
must be cognizant of the courts but have little exposure to congres-
sional intervention, MLB consistently faces pressure from both the
93. See id.
94. See id. at 308.
95. Id.; MLB Has Deal to Keep “Extra Innings” on Cable TV, ESPN.COM (Apr. 4, 2007,
10:16 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2826280 [hereinafter MLB Has Deal]. 
96. See MLB Has Deal, supra note 95.
97. See Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 308 (referring to the DirecTV deal as evidence that
baseball “realizes that its antitrust exemption does not offer strong protection”).
98. See MLB Has Deal, supra note 95. The actual value of the DirecTV deal was not
released publicly, though DirecTV’s President said that the “economics [were] better” under
the reworked deal. See id.
99. See Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 308. There are significant questions as to whether the
Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006), would have applied, but any resulting
lawsuit is likely to have hinged on the antitrust exemption either way. See Tomlinson, supra
note 4, at 308.
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legislative and judicial branches. There are several examples of this
throughout baseball history; this Note will focus solely on franchise
relocation and expansion.
The moves of the Dodgers to Los Angeles and the Giants to San
Francisco are thought to be great accomplishments for MLB’s
leaders,100 yet the moves were just as much a result of congressional
intervention as they were the genius of ownership. In 1951, the
House Monopoly Subcommittee held hearings on MLB’s rejection of
a proposed merger with the Pacific Coast League (PCL).101 Despite
threats from multiple congresspeople, MLB did not budge and
continued to stonewall the PCL and the western United States.102
The Committee responded by issuing a report in May of 1952 sug-
gesting revocation of the exemption as a way to force MLB to
expand its territorial footprint to the West.103 The report further
went on to question the structure of MLB, namely that several cities
had multiple teams, one much less successful than the other,
including Boston, Philadelphia, and St. Louis.104 Within two years,
the Boston Braves moved to Milwaukee, the St. Louis Browns
moved to Baltimore, and the Philadelphia Athletics moved to
Kansas City.105 None of the relocations could be considered volun-
tary,106 but for many in Congress westward expansion remained a
priority.107 Not coincidentally, in 1958, the Dodgers and Giants both
left New York for California.108
100. E.g., Lewis Abraham Leader, 50 Years Ago Today, Westward Expansion, S.F. CHRON.
(Apr. 15, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/04/15/SP3E
1046NH.DTL.
101. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 27-28. 
102. Id. at 29.
103. H.R. REP. NO. 82-2002, at 230 (1952). 
104. Id. at 84-85. 
105. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 31-33 (discussing the pressures and disputes that
surrounded these three relocations).
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 36 (noting that it was the moves to California that placated Congress, as the
Athletics’ move to Kansas City did not exactly make MLB bicoastal).
108. See Scibilia, supra note 9, at 456 n.222. These two moves are more likely to have been
voluntary because of Los Angeles and San Francisco’s market potential. See id. at 455-57.
However, expanding baseball to California was a subject for the House Monopoly
Subcommittee as early as 1951, and even those two cities encountered resistance from the
baseball establishment prior to 1958. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 27-28.
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Before the dust could settle from the wave of relocations men-
tioned above, MLB had to deal with the issue of expansion. Prior to
1960, MLB had never expanded despite the efforts of many upstart
leagues, independent franchises, ambitious municipalities, and
Congress.109 Yet that would soon change as a result of both congres-
sional and legal threats. In response to yet another failed merger
attempt, this one by the Continental League, Senator Estes
Kefauver proposed legislation and convened hearings on the legality
of MLB’s “special” exemption.110 At the same time, William Shea,
head of a committee formed to bring a second team to New York,
was ambitiously signing away players from MLB in an effort to force
MLB to sue over the reserve clause.111 MLB, realizing it was being
attacked on multiple fronts, relented and allowed four new fran-
chises to join the league.112
The events surrounding MLB’s most recent expansion in 1995
illustrate the same convergence of outside forces. In 1992, Bob
Lurie, owner of the San Francisco Giants, entered into an agree-
ment with a group of investors intending to move the Giants to St.
Petersburg, Florida.113 The city of St. Petersburg had made several
attempts to persuade an MLB team to relocate and thought it had
succeeded with the Giants.114 However, MLB rejected the proposed
agreement, purportedly because of concerns raised in the back-
ground checks of the investment group’s leaders, Vincent Piazza and
Vincent Tirendi.115 A group based in San Francisco promised to keep
the team there and subsequently purchased the Giants for less, with
109. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 39. 
110. Id. at 37-38.
111. Id. at 38-39.
112. Id. at 39-40 (“With the two headed dragon of the judicial and legislative branches
looming over them, the Lords knew that they would have to give ground. Their reserve clause
was going to be challenged, either through antitrust or contract law, and likely defeated if
they continued to resist pressure to expand.”).
113. See Scibilia, supra note 9, at 414-15.
114. See JONAH KERI, THE EXTRA 2%: HOW WALL STREET STRATEGIES TOOK A MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL TEAM FROM WORST TO FIRST 25-26 (2011). 
115. See Grow, supra note 3, at 586.
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MLB’s explicit approval.116 The disgruntled investment group then
filed suit, alleging defamation and violation of antitrust law.117
MLB filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Baseball, but the
court denied the motion, holding that MLB’s exemption applied only
to the reserve clause.118 The court undertook a thorough analysis of
the trilogy of Supreme Court cases and found that Flood had
stripped Federal Baseball of all its precedential value outside of the
reserve clause.119 Meanwhile, Congress became involved again, as
the Senate Judiciary Committee scheduled hearings for its Anti-
trust Subcommittee to consider overturning the exemption.120 As a
result, the parties settled the case before the lower court’s decision
was reviewed on appeal.121 Less than two years later, MLB an-
nounced a new round of expansion and unanimously voted for a
franchise in the Tampa/St. Petersburg area.122
If MLB continually reacts to outside pressures, solely out of fear
for the future of its antitrust exemption, then the exemption is
likely not improving the league’s outlook. The preceding examples
illustrate that many of MLB’s operations over the past several
decades were at least partially motivated by pressure from Congress
and the courts. It is clear from the record surrounding each of these
events that outside forces compelled MLB to take actions that it
originally opposed. This is not to argue that expansion or relocation
is always negative, but from this framework it would be easy to
imagine a scenario in which external pressure forced MLB into a
decision it viewed as decidedly negative. 
116. Id. This is probably the best example of MLB actually asserting its exemption, but
even this shows MLB’s fear of intervention. The reason given for rejecting the St. Petersburg’s
group’s bid was not the interests of baseball or its fans, but rather problems with background
checks of the acquiring ownership group. The exemption, as MLB often portrays it, is
supposed to serve the public interest and protect baseball’s special covenant with its fans, see
infra note 220 and accompanying text, yet those were not among the reasons given here.
117. Piazza v. MLB, 831 F. Supp. 420, 423-24 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
118. Id. at 421.
119. See id. at 434-38 (“In Flood, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to invalidate
the rule of Federal Baseball and Toolson. Thus no rule from those cases binds the lower courts
as a matter of stare decisis.”). 
120. See Selig, supra note 49, at 277-78. 
121. Ostertag, supra note 6, at 63.
122. The terms of the settlement were never made public, but Piazza told a member of the
media shortly after the settlement that he was certain the St. Petersburg area would be
getting an MLB franchise soon. Nathanson, supra note 8, at 42.
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Assuming that the exemption is as powerful as MLB publicly
portrays it to be, MLB would likely use the exemption to sanction
practices that would otherwise be violations. Yet a cursory look at
MLB operations points to no such practice, or even attempted prac-
tice.123 As Professor Nathanson wrote, “in its zeal to protect its
exemption and reserve clause, [MLB] bargained away much of the
power these tools supposedly gave it.”124
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A POTENTIAL POLICY CHANGE
In order to determine precisely how important—or unimportant
—the antitrust exemption actually is to MLB and its essential oper-
ations, it is necessary to examine how MLB would fare if exposed to
antitrust scrutiny. This analysis reveals two things: first, that
courts would be unlikely to treat challenges to MLB’s structure any
differently than they currently do; and second, proper application of
antitrust law would not negatively impact MLB’s structure and
operations. These conclusions further reinforce the notion that
MLB’s exemption has an extremely limited practical application.
A. Application of Antitrust Law
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract,
combination in the form or trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal.”125 The
Supreme Court has not interpreted the statutory language strictly,
holding that not all restraints of trade are unlawful as section 1 only
prohibits restraints that unreasonably restrain trade, not those that
promote competition.126 The Court further noted that, “[e]very agree-
ment concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind,
to restrain, is of their very essence.”127 As a result, the Court’s
123. See supra Part II.C.
124. Nathanson, supra note 8, at 40.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
126. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
127. Id.
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antitrust jurisprudence has created two tests to determine whether
a practice is in violation of the Sherman Act.128
1. Per Se vs. Rule of Reason 
When reviewing a practice under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
the Supreme Court will apply either the “per se illegality” test or the
“rule of reason” test. The per se illegality test is “invoked when
surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive
conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of
the challenged conduct.”129 The rule of reason test is applicable
when “restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all.”130 In applying rule of reason analysis, the Court is
to compare the anticompetitive effects of a practice with its “pro-
competitive impact and business justifications.”131 In other words,
the validity of the challenged restraint is judged on how it impacts
competition.132
The Supreme Court has consistently chosen the rule of reason
standard over the per se illegality test in cases involving sports.133
In an action challenging MLB, a court is almost certain to follow
suit and perform its analysis under the rule of reason; in fact, the
Second Circuit did so in Salvino.134 Because there is no compelling
reason to depart from previous precedent, it is safe to assume that
another court would apply the rule of reason test to a case challeng-
ing MLB.
128. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has recognized the “single entity” defense
when entities, usually a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, are deemed incapable
of conspiring with one another as a result of a complete unity of interest. See Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-72, 777 (1984). Several sports leagues
have attempted to assert the single entity defense, but the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
it in 2010. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010). There is no reason to
believe that MLB would be treated as a single entity. 
129. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984).
130. Id. at 101. 
131. Scibilia, supra note 9, at 434.
132. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104. 
133. See Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 40, at 294 (“[A] plaintiff would have to prove an
anti-competitive effect under a rule of reason analysis, which is generally the standard used
to judge sports leagues’ conduct.”); Scibilia, supra note 9, at 435 (“[T]he Supreme Court has
expressed an unwillingness to apply the per se test to cases involving sports leagues.”).
134.  MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008).
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B. Analysis Under Rule of Reason
In such an analysis, it is important to remember that the purpose
of antitrust regulation is to promote consumer welfare.135 The
Supreme Court has defined consumer welfare in terms of unre-
stricted output, nonmonopolistic pricing, and responsiveness to
consumer preference.136 This notion, combined with the Supreme
Court’s stated mandate to invalidate only actions that are unreason-
able restraints,137 will serve as the framework for examining how
MLB’s organizational structure and practices would survive a rule
of reason analysis in the courts.
1. Factors Suggesting MLB’s Practices Might Pass Rule of
Reason Analysis
Before applying antitrust scrutiny to specific policies, it is useful
to refer back to Holmes’s recognition of MLB’s unique characteris-
tics and needs.138 Arguably, the most important need is competitive
balance among the teams in the league. MLB’s system and structure
are unlike those of any other American professional sports league,
as it is the only league without a salary cap.139 Economic inequality
and competitive balance problems are major concerns, spawning the
development of revenue sharing and a luxury tax for the franchises
with the highest payrolls.140 Yet those measures are only part of the
system that guarantees competitive balance, and competitive bal-
ance is necessary to protect the interests of the consumer.141 For
135. See Scibilia, supra note 9, at 440 (“The Supreme Court, in light of its shift toward
neoclassical economic theory, has in recent years focused on ‘consumer welfare’ as the major
goal of antitrust policy.” (footnotes omitted)). 
136. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107-08 (stating that Congress designed the Sherman Act to protect
consumer welfare and that restraints on price and output are “paradigmatic examples” of the
conduct that Congress intended the Act to remedy). 
137. Id. at 98 (“[A]s we have repeatedly recognized, the Sherman Act was intended to
prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.”).
138. See supra notes 70, 91 and accompanying text.
139. See Gould, supra note 52, at 62. A salary cap is a completely artificial restriction on
compensation that baseball has never instituted, much to its owners’ chagrin. Id. at 73-74.
140. See Ostertag, supra note 6, at 67.
141. See Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 40, at 293 (noting that a system providing
opportunities for small and midmarket teams is necessary to the health of the sport).
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that reason, when examining MLB’s practices, one must be keenly
aware of their effects on competition within the league, as well as
competition in the traditional sense of antitrust regulation.
The two best examples, though certainly not the only ones, are
the draft and the player control system. When players are initially
drafted or signed by an MLB franchise, that franchise owns their
rights unconditionally while the players are in the minor leagues
and in their first three years of service time.142 During that period,
the franchise unilaterally determines the salaries for those players
in accordance with league rules.143 After three years of service time,
or under special circumstances between two and three years, indi-
vidual players become eligible for arbitration.144 The independent
arbiter, absent an agreement between the parties, determines the
player’s compensation by selecting either the proposed salary figure
submitted by the team or the figure proposed by the player.145 The
arbiter is permitted to review salaries of other players not exceeding
one year of service above the player’s level of service time for
comparative purposes.146 A player only reaches free agency after six
years of service time.147
The player control and arbitration system described above
artificially restricts player compensation, as players are not paid in
accordance with performance for at least three years of MLB service
time,148 and even in their arbitration years generally make less than
142. See Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 290-91. Players, when drafted or signed, can negotiate
signing bonuses and certain contract provisions, but their salaries in the minor leagues are
not negotiable because they can only negotiate with one team. See Rick J. Lopez, Signing
Bonus Skimming and a Premature Call for a Global Draft in Major League Baseball, 41 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 349, 353 (2009). Once they make it to the major league level, players make close to
the league minimum, as determined by the franchise, for their first three years unless the two
parties work out a long-term contract. Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 290-91. Players’ bargaining
power is further restricted under the most recent collective bargaining agreement, wherein
each franchise is limited by a spending cap for its draft picks. See Keith Law, New CBA a Net
Loss for Baseball, ESPN.COM (Nov. 22, 2011, 4:09 PM), http://insider.espn.go.com/mlb/blog/_/
name/law_keith/id/7270031/mlb-new-collective-bargaining-agreement-does-more-harm-good.
Teams that exceed the cap are subject to penalties, including the loss of future draft picks. Id.
143. See Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 291. 
144. See Gould, supra note 52, at 71-72.
145. Id. at 67.
146. Id. at 71-72.
147. Id. at 69.
148. The classic example is San Francisco Giants pitcher Tim Lincecum, who won the Cy
Young Award—the award for the most outstanding pitcher—in his first two full seasons while
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they could on the open market.149 Yet this is nearly unanimously
considered good for the game because allowing individual teams to
draft and develop their own affordable talent gives small and
midmarket teams the opportunity to compete with high revenue
producing franchises.150 Without this player control system, big
market teams like the New York Yankees or Boston Red Sox would
be able to buy all the young talent away from small market teams,
making it much more difficult for those clubs to compete.151 Though
a free labor market would increase competition on the micro level
for individual players, it would destroy competitive balance on the
macro level, as the overall success of the league depends on each
team having at least some ability to compete financially.152
As the above example illustrates, any antitrust analysis must
consider a practice’s procompetitive effects as well as its restraints
on competition. In order to promote consumer welfare—in terms of
the factors cited by the Supreme Court—MLB must set up a system
with significant constraints, as all professional sports leagues
require competitive balance to be successful; otherwise the demand
for the product would rapidly decrease.153
2. Franchise Relocation 
The aspect of MLB’s current policies most susceptible to antitrust
regulation is almost assuredly franchise issues, specifically fran-
making only $405,000 and $650,000 respectively. Tim Lincecum: Player, BASEBALL-
REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/players/l/linceti01.shtml (last visited Oct.
15, 2012). 
149. See Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 291.
150. See, e.g., Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 40, at 293. There is controversy, especially
in light of the most recent collective bargaining agreement, about whether MLB’s player
control system is the best way to improve competitiveness, which is far beyond the scope of
this Note. See generally Law, supra note 142. The important consideration, however, is that
all agree that there must be some system that restricts the free movement of players, because
otherwise competitive balance would be destroyed.
151. Tomlinson, supra note 4, at 292-93.
152. Id. (“[M]aking sure that every team has the ability to be competitive is necessary for
the overall success of the league.”).
153. James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims
After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 521-22 (2011) (noting that competitive
balance, and thus the uncertainty of a particular outcome, is a principle factor in driving the
appeal of a sporting event to consumers).
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chise relocation.154 MLB, like all professional sports leagues, has
promulgated a series of rules governing the relocation of a franchise.
No league approval is needed for a franchise to move into an
unoccupied city with a population of over 2.4 million.155 For a team
to move into an unoccupied territory of less than 2.4 million people,
three-fourths of the league must approve.156 To move into a city that
is already home to another franchise, the moving franchise must
be a member of the other league—National League or American
League—and obtain the three-fourths approval.157 The phrase
“home territory,” or occupied territory, denotes a designated geo-
graphical area in which each franchise has exclusive rights.158 It is
unclear whether these rules would sustain a rule of reason analysis.
The conventional wisdom seems to be that the franchise rules would
be invalidated,159 but a more reasoned analysis would suggest that
MLB should prevail in a rule of reason challenge. 
a. L.A. Coliseum and Other Non-Baseball Cases 
The most important franchise relocation case is Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, decided in 1984.160 The
Ninth Circuit invalidated the NFL’s franchise relocation rule,161
which was remarkably similar to MLB’s current rule for occupied
territory.162 Some commentators have suggested that because of this
decision, MLB’s rule would ultimately fail if reviewed by the
courts.163 That assertion, however, misinterprets the holding of L.A.
154. This is apparent because it is also the subject that has drawn the most attention in
legal scholarship. See, e.g., Thomas R. Hurst & Jeffrey M. McFarland, The Effect of Repeal of
the Baseball Antitrust Exemption on Franchise Relocations, 8 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.
263, 264-65 (1998); Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise
Relocations from Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace
Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 60-
63 (1997).
155. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 22. 
156. Id. at 22.
157. Id. at 22-23.
158. See Hurst & McFarland, supra note 154, at 274.
159. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 43.
160. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL (L.A. Coliseum I), 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
161. Id. at 1398, 1401.
162. See Nathanson, supra note 8, at 22.
163. See, e.g., id. at 23.
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Coliseum, ignores the court’s analysis in the subsequent damages
case, and fails to properly consider the effects of market definition
and competitive balance on consumer welfare.
The dispute in L.A. Coliseum arose after the Los Angeles Rams
moved to Anaheim and left the city of Los Angeles without a team
to play in its premier venue, the Coliseum; the Oakland Raiders
desired to fill the void.164 Standing in their way was NFL Rule 4.3,
which required three-fourths approval of the other franchises in
order for a team to move into the home territory of another NFL
franchise.165 The NFL subsequently voted unanimously against the
move, motivating the Raiders and the Coliseum owners to institute
an antitrust action.166 The Ninth Circuit used the rule of reason and
engaged in a “thorough investigation of the industry at issue and a
balancing of the arrangement’s positive and negative effects on
competition.”167 Using this analysis, the court held that the NFL
could not prevent the Raiders from moving to Los Angeles.168
Although the decision seems to completely invalidate the NFL’s
restrictions on relocation, the court’s holding is not as expansive as
it appears. The court acknowledged that there were potential
procompetitive effects but that the NFL had not instituted any
requirements that those factors be considerations in its vote on the
Raiders.169 This recognition suggested that if the rule had contained
some procedural safeguards, it might have survived under rule of
reason.170 This implication was confirmed in the subsequent dam-
ages case, as the Ninth Circuit revisited its prior opinion and made
it clear that the rule was only invalidated as applied, not on its
face.171
164. L.A. Coliseum I, 726 F.2d at 1384-85.
165. Id. at 1385. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1391 (quoting Cascade Cabinet Co. v. W. Cabinet & Millwork, Inc., 710 F.2d
1366, 1373 (9th Cir. 1983)).
168. Id. at 1401.
169. Id. at 1397 (mentioning population, economic projections, facilities, and regional
balance as potential factors for consideration).
170. Id. (“Some sort of procedural mechanism to ensure consideration of all the above
factors may also be necessary.”).
171. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL (L.A. Coliseum II), 791 F.2d 1356, 1368-69, 1375
(9th Cir. 1986). 
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Despite stating that “the relevant market provides the basis on
which to balance competitive harms and benefits of the restraint at
issue,”172 the court never precisely defined that market.173 As a
result, L.A. Coliseum is of questionable precedential value to MLB.
Even though MLB’s relocation rules look similar to the NFL’s,
baseball has been much more willing to entertain multiple fran-
chises in one city than the NFL.174 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
itself has indicated that the rule in L.A. Coliseum is limited in that
some restrictions on franchise relocation would survive rule of
reason scrutiny.175 In a subsequent NBA case, the court reversed an
order for summary judgment on the basis of L.A. Coliseum, con-
firming its position that the restraints in L.A. Coliseum were only
invalid as applied.176
b. Defining the Applicable Market 
In order to weigh the procompetitive effects of a restraint against
its anticompetitive effects, a court applying the rule of reason must
define the relevant market and consider how that market oper-
ates.177 The relevant market includes both a product market and a
geographic market.178 Even though it did not offer a precise def-
inition, it is clear in L.A. Coliseum that the court adopted a narrow
market definition.179 Yet, the nature of rule of reason analysis
guarantees that there are no “hard and fast rules” for determining
the applicable market.180 A thorough analysis of the market for
major league-caliber baseball indicates that the narrow market
interpretation of L.A. Coliseum would be improper, at least as it
relates to the product market. 
172. L.A. Coliseum I, 726 F.2d at 1392.
173. Id. at 1394 (“Here the exceptional nature of the industry makes precise market
definition especially difficult.”).
174. Hurst & McFarland, supra note 154, at 297. Baseball currently has three such
markets: New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, though the Angels play in Anaheim. Id. at 297
n.220.
175. NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 
176. Id. at 567-68.
177. L.A. Coliseum I, 726 F.2d at 1392.
178. Id. at 1392-93.
179. See Scibilia, supra note 9, at 438.
180. Hurst & McFarland, supra note 154, at 274.
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The product market is defined by the reasonable interchange-
ability of the product and the cross-elasticity of demand among
related products.181 Economic research has shown that MLB fran-
chises are not competing as much among themselves as they are
competing with alternative uses for people’s leisure time and
entertainment dollars.182 Another test for determining the relevant
product market is the sensitivity of the product to price changes.183
If a small increase in price would drive consumers to substitutes,
then that substitute should be included in the properly defined
market.184 If MLB’s prices were to rise above the current market
level, a compelling argument could be made that its consumer base
would migrate to other entertainment options.185
Obviously, teams compete with one another in some sense, but
the true competition in the economic market is between baseball, as
a whole, and other entertainment choices.186 This makes sense when
one considers the draw of professional sports to its consumers.
Generally, fans choose their favorite teams and develop a strong
loyalty and identity tied to a specific team.187 Therefore, the market
to consider is not among individual franchises, because, generally
speaking, the consumers are going to support one specific team even
if there are others in the area. 
An individual team’s commercial strategy is extremely unlikely
to affect the economic performance of any other team, even if the
181. L.A. Coliseum I, 726 F.2d at 1393.
182. See McKeown, supra note 153, at 521; Scibilia, supra note 9, at 441.
183. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The
technique for this analysis is known as the “small but significant non-transitory increase in
price” test (SSNIP), and is used extensively by the FTC and Department of Justice in
reviewing transactions for antitrust implications. Id.
184. Id.
185. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
186. Donald L. Alexander, Major League Baseball: Monopoly Pricing and Profit-Maximizing
Behavior, 2 J. SPORTS ECON. 341, 347 (2001) (“[C]onsumers view baseball as one form of
entertainment among many, and although team owners have a monopoly position in MLB in
a particular city, they are nevertheless competing for the consumer’s dollar in a broader
entertainment market.”).
187. See Scibilia, supra note 9, at 442 (“[M]ost fans of one Chicago or New York club, for
example, would not be caught dead in the ballpark of the other club, even if the other club was
charging $1 for seats behind the dugout.”).
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franchises are located in close proximity to one another.188 MLB,
then, must act in the best interest of all its teams when creating and
enforcing its rules, recognizing that the health of the sport is
dependent on attracting and maintaining consumers of MLB teams
collectively.189 Structuring its relocation rules based on competition
among franchises would be shortsighted. Accordingly, the procom-
petitive aspects of MLB’s rules are designed to improve its position
versus other entertainment options.190
The applicable market should not be defined as professional
baseball within a certain geographical region, but rather all enter-
tainment options in that area. At the very least, the market should
encompass other professional and college sports because a narrower
market definition ignores the economic realities described above. 
c. Procompetitive Aspects
MLB has a strong financial interest in maintaining franchise
stability; it benefits the league, the individual franchises, and the
consumers.191 Franchise relocation restrictions help achieve finan-
cial stability for its franchises, geographic diversity, traditional
rivalries, and fan loyalty, each of which is essential to the health of
a professional sports league.192 Stability also increases MLB’s
attractiveness to potential television partners, as networks are less
likely to commit billions of dollars if they are uncertain as to the
geographical makeup of the league.193 For the same reason, geograp-
hical diversity is important for national advertising and other media
contracts.194 Competitive balance is also at stake, particularly in
MLB,195 because there is a strong causal link between revenue/
188. See Alexander, supra note 186, at 348; see also Scibilia, supra note 9, at 441-42 &
n.175 (reporting research on the cross-elasticity of demand among games played in different
ballparks).
189. See Ostertag, supra note 6, at 66-67.
190. See Scibilia, supra note 9, at 439 (“[The restraints] serve to make [b]aseball more
competitive vis a vis other sports and forms of entertainment.”).
191. See Mitten & Burton, supra note 154, at 103.
192. See Scibilia, supra note 9, at 439.
193. See Mitten & Burton, supra note 154, at 103. 
194. Id.
195. See Grow, supra note 3, at 609 (“Moreover, franchise location can also have an impact
on competitive balance.... [M]aintaining control over franchise location decisions not only
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payroll and on-field performance.196 It should be apparent, then,
that there are significant procompetitive aspects of MLB’s restric-
tions on franchise relocation that would outweigh their
anticompetitive effects if a court were to use the appropriate market
definition.
d. Consumer Welfare
The final consideration is whether MLB’s franchise restrictions
satisfy the Supreme Court’s notion of consumer welfare, defined as
unrestricted output, nonmonopolistic pricing, and responsiveness to
consumer preference.197 Clearly, franchise relocation restrictions do
not reduce output in the global sense, as the number of teams
remains constant. The only potential argument would be that the
rules restrict output for the city that wishes to attract a team.
However, such a contention, if accepted, would lead to absurd
results.198 Under that reasoning, any city wishing to field a team
could officially petition MLB and immediately file suit if MLB
rejected its petition, with no consideration as to whether the city
would be an appropriate host for a major league franchise.199
Certainly that result is not consistent with the intent of the
Sherman Act, as MLB would face an inordinate number of suits
challenging every restriction on franchise movement, no matter how
reasonable. This notion is also directly at odds with the Ninth
Circuit’s view in L.A. Coliseum.200
As a further consideration, all professional sports are national
industries; technology allows consumers to gain access to games and
exposure to teams across the country, regardless of where they are
located. For example, MLB offers services that broadcast out-of-
market games on television, computer, radio, and wireless devices
allows leagues to ensure that franchises are located only in cities large enough to support a
team financially, but also that those cities are not over populated with too many teams.”).
196. Ostertag, supra note 6, at 67. 
197. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).
198. See Scibilia, supra note 9, at 444. 
199. Id. This seems to further reinforce the notion that MLB’s relevant market for antitrust
purposes must be broader than simply professional baseball in the particular city.
200. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (arguing that many of MLB’s franchise
restrictions would survive a rule of reason review).
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like the smartphone and iPad.201 Whether a team is able to relocate
does not affect output in a meaningful way, because the consumers
of the sport have nearly unlimited access to the product. No longer
is being an engaged fan dependent on one’s proximity to their
favorite team.
Likewise, franchise relocation has a negligible effect on pricing.202
Market studies show that ticket prices are determined almost
entirely by factors such as team stature, a home team’s place in the
standings, a visiting team’s place in the standings, and star
power.203 Examining cities where there are multiple teams like New
York and Chicago confirms this dynamic. If consumer prices were
determined by the availability and competition of neighboring
franchises, prices would be lower in these two cities. Instead, the
opposite is true; prices in New York and Chicago are higher than in
many cities with just one team.204 The Yankees and Cubs are two of
the most valuable and popular franchises in MLB.205 Each has been
in its current city for well over one hundred years and enjoys a
strong tradition,206 creating a demand that is not affected by the
existence of another franchise in the same geographic area.
Consumer prices, then, are more about the franchise’s stature and
competitive prowess than they are about neighboring franchises.207
Finally, MLB’s rules show that the league is responsive to the
interests and desires of its consumers. All fans of a professional
sports team wish for the team to remain, but franchise stability
holds even greater importance in baseball.208 Baseball, more than
201. See, e.g., MLB.com Media Center, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mediacenter/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2012).
202. Scibilia, supra note 9, at 441 (“[I]t does seem clear that [b]aseball’s franchise
relocations have not led to the expansion of monopoly prices.”).
203. See id. at 443.
204. See Alexander, supra note 186, at 348 (“One hypothesis suggests that demand is more
elastic given the presence of a second team. The regression results, however, indicate that the
presence of a second team does not matter.”).
205. Baseball’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/
lists/2011/33/baseball-valuations-11_land.html.
206. See Baseball Teams, BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/
teammenu.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
207. See Alexander, supra note 186, at 348.
208. Scibilia, supra note 9, at 447, 450 (observing that baseball fans desire franchise
stability and are “indoctrinated into the histories of their teams”). 
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any other sport, is inextricably tied to its history and tradition.209
Allowing for free movement of franchises would destroy a great deal
of that history and tradition, harming the consumers who invest so
heavily into it. Even discounting the damage that a lack of regional
balance and geographic diversity might have on the league, per-
vasive relocation is an unsatisfying prospect in a sport in which
brand loyalty and tradition are very powerful.
Antitrust law exists to protect the consumer welfare; striking
down MLB’s relocation rules does not serve that purpose. For the
above reasons, it becomes clear that MLB’s franchise relocation
rules are not inconsistent with the purpose of federal antitrust
regulations, and would be upheld under a rule of reason analysis.
3. Expansion
Franchise expansion is often linked to franchise relocation;
however, it is a much simpler issue to resolve. It is easy to see that
the number of teams within a league has a direct and substantial
impact on the distribution and quality of the product.210 MLB must
be permitted to unilaterally restrict expansion, otherwise the
product would be diluted and the structure of the league would be
unmanageable.211 The courts have recognized this fundamental
issue, best explained in MLB v. Butterworth: “It is difficult to con-
ceive of a decision more integral to the business of major league
baseball than the number of clubs that will be allowed to com-
pete.”212 The same, presumably, could be said about contracting
teams, though MLB’s financial situation makes contraction a
remote possibility.213 It thus seems safe to say that expansion would
be beyond the reach of antitrust regulation.
209. Id. at 448.
210. See Grow, supra note 3, at 608.
211. See id.
212. 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1332 (N.D. Fla. 2001), aff’d sub. nom. MLB v. Crist, 331 F.3d
1177 (11th Cir. 2003).
213. See generally Maury Brown, Why Contraction in Major League Baseball Is a Pipe
Dream, BIZ OF BASEBALL (Apr. 5, 2011, 8:27 AM), http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option
=com_content&view=article&id=5152:why-contraction-in-major-league-baseball-is-a-pipe-
dream&catid=26:editorials&Itemid=39. 
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4. The Minor League System
Several commentators have asserted that, without an antitrust
exemption, MLB’s minor league structure, like franchise relocation,
could be vulnerable to an antitrust challenge.214 As alluded to above,
however, MLB’s player control system, to include minor league
baseball, is necessary to promote competitive balance at the major
league level and improve the product going to the consumer.215
Eliminating or substantially altering the current minor league
system would change the entire nature of professional baseball and
the hundreds of small towns and cities across the country that
currently serve as homes to minor league baseball clubs. Without
the parent organizations, many minor league franchises would be
unable to operate, as the current business model is possible only
because the parent organization pays the salaries of all players,
coaches, and trainers.216 Without MLB subsidies, the prices for
minor league games are likely to increase substantially.
This would undoubtedly adversely affect consumers, as minor
league baseball offers cheaper, family-friendly entertainment in
hundreds of small towns and cities that otherwise may not have
exposure to professional sports.217 The best young players in
baseball are likely to play in as many as three or four different cities
on their way to the major leagues,218 offering countless opportunities
for consumers that would not be possible without this structure.
Minor league baseball is a restraint in that it restricts player move-
ment and compensation, but it actually increases output and
provides real benefits to MLB’s consumers. A thorough analysis
under the rule of reason is highly unlikely to declare the minor
league system a restraint on trade in violation of section 1 of the
214. E.g., Grow, supra note 3, at 610; Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 40, at 293. 
215. See supra Part IV.B.1.
216. See Eric Scheible, Note, No Runs. No Hits. One Error: Eliminating Major League
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Will Not Save the Game, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 73, 91
n.151 (1995).
217. See Grow, supra note 3, at 610.
218. Cf. id. at 610-11 (discussing how MLB teams assign their players to each of their
minor league teams).
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Sherman Act, because without the restraint, the product would not
be available at all.219
C. Counterarguments as to How MLB Would Be Hurt by a    
Revocation Fail
Admittedly, the contention that an exemption from antitrust law
adversely affects an entity is bound to provoke criticism. One would
think an exemption should allow that particular entity to engage in
behavior that would otherwise be illegal. A common argument, and
the one advanced by MLB itself, is that the exemption confers a
general ability for MLB to serve the “public interest” and protect its
“special covenant” with its fans.220 What the facts show is that
baseball has been unable and unwilling to take any actions that are
fundamentally different than those of any other professional sports
league. 
Bud Selig, in his testimony to the Antitrust Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, explained this theory in the following
way: “The fact of the matter is that the threat of antitrust liability
has caused nothing but confusion and instability in the other
professional sports.”221 Selig’s position, however, is far from unas-
sailable. As demonstrated, other professional sports have flourished
without an antitrust exemption, so it is difficult to maintain that an
exemption from antitrust law is necessary for a professional sports
league to succeed.222
Commissioner Selig’s main contention in support of his instability
claim was that the application of antitrust laws prevents leagues
from protecting franchise stability and leads to “inevitable chaos
219. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
220. See Baseball’s Antitrust Immunity: Hearing on the Validity of Major League Baseball’s
Exemption from the Antitrust Laws Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Bus.
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 105-06 (1992) [hereinafter Baseball’s
Antitrust Immunity Hearing] (statement of Allan H. Selig, President of the Milwaukee
Brewers Baseball Club). Selig was elected as the ninth commissioner of MLB on July 9, 1998.
MLB Executives: Allan H. (Bud) Selig, MLB.COM, http://mlb.com/mlb/official_info/
about_mlb/executives.jsp?bio=selig_bud (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
221. Baseball’s Antitrust Immunity Hearing, supra note 220, at 119.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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and inefficiency.”223 In his testimony, Selig specifically referenced
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in L.A. Coliseum.224 As this Note demon-
strates, the reasoning of L.A. Coliseum would not guarantee a
similar outcome in a case implicating baseball.225 Further, the NFL
is not wrought with franchise chaos or inefficiency, nor has the
outcome of that case had a devastating impact on communities with
professional football. 
Since the L.A. Coliseum decision in 1984, there have been five
relocations of NFL franchises.226 One of these five involved the
Raiders moving back to Oakland from Los Angeles.227 In three of the
other four cases, the city from which the franchise relocated saw
another franchise move into town within a decade.228 The lone
exception is Los Angeles,229 the second largest media market in the
country.230 If the “chaos” was really a matter of owners uprooting
their organizations for “greener pastures” as Selig claims,231 it is
hard to imagine why there is no team in Los Angeles, or why there
has not been more franchise movement in the NFL. 
Another potentially compelling argument as to how baseball
might be materially injured by a repeal of its antitrust exemption is
that its financial information would no longer be private. Some
within the baseball industry believe that keeping its financial books
closed is one of MLB’s principle motivations for fighting to protect
223. Baseball’s Antitrust Immunity Hearing, supra note 220, at 112 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
224. Id. at 111.
225. See supra Part IV.B.2.a. (discussing L.A. Coliseum and the subsequent cases applying
it).
226. See History of NFL Franchises, 1920-Present, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME,
http://www.profootballhof.com/history/stats/franchises.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
227. Id. The Raiders moved from Oakland to Los Angeles in 1982 and then back to Oakland
in 1995, where they remain.
228. Id. The three examples: Cleveland lost the Browns to Baltimore in 1996 (the franchise
changed its name to the Ravens) and was compensated with an expansion team, also named
the Browns, in 1999; St. Louis lost the Cardinals to Phoenix in 1988, but seven years later the
Rams moved from Los Angeles; Houston lost the Oilers to Tennessee in 1996, but also got an
expansion franchise, this one in 2002. Id.
229. Id.
230. Top 100 Television Markets, STATION INDEX, http://www.stationindex.com/tv/tv-
markets (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
231. Selig, supra note 49, at 281.
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its exemption.232 The utility of this argument is questionable at best;
neither the NFL nor NBA seem to be materially injured by the lack
of an antitrust exemption that assists in keeping their financial
records private.233
The focus of this matter, however, is not whether baseball guards
its financial information, but rather, why and how MLB would be
affected if those books were available for antitrust investigations. A
common theory is that it would weaken franchise bargaining power
over stadium financing with their municipalities.234 The contention
is that franchises attempt to hold localities hostage with the threat
of relocation, claiming that they are losing money in that city and
would need to move without a new, publicly funded stadium.235 This
is true to some degree; it is probably why MLB has seen a signifi-
cant number of new publicly funded stadiums in recent years.236
Since 2000, fourteen of thirty teams have built new stadiums; look
back to 1997 and the number of new stadiums becomes eighteen.237
Yet this rapid increase in new, publicly funded stadiums is highly
unlikely to continue. In the wake of the construction of these new
ballparks, there has been increased research into the economic
impact of new stadiums to the surrounding area. Economist Phillip
Miller has written extensively on the subject and found that the
construction of new sports stadiums is not a catalyst for either em-
ployment or economic output.238 Indeed, the consensus of independ-
232. See, e.g., KERI, supra note 114, at 29 (“If an antitrust case were ever to go to court, the
league would be forced to open its books, something it desperately strives to avoid.”). MLB has
also launched its own suits to prevent government officials from issuing civil investigative
demands. See, e.g., MLB v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1318 (N.D. Fla. 2001);
Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1994). The
two courts came to inconsistent decisions, with the Florida Supreme Court finding the
exemption to be limited to the reserve clause, and the federal court finding that MLB’s
exemption prevented investigation. See Grow, supra note 3, at 584-85, 588. 
233. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
234. See KERI, supra note 114, at 29.
235. Id. 
236. See Phillip Miller, Private Financing and Sports Franchise Values: The Case of Major
League Baseball, 8 J. SPORTS ECON. 449, 452 (2007). 
237. See American League Ballparks, BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/stadium/stadium2.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2012); National League Ballparks,
BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/stadium/stadiu2b.shtml (last visited
Oct. 15, 2012). 
238. See Miller, supra note 236, at 450-51.
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ent academic studies is that the existence of sports stadiums does
not have a net positive economic impact on a municipality.239 These
studies have particular importance in today’s economy, as states
and localities attempt to tighten their budgets.240 Thus, it could be
said that the era of publicly funded stadiums is over.241 In this
context, the impact of disclosing financial information is likely to be
minimal to the league and its member organizations. 
The final consideration worthy of mention is the notion that even
if none of baseball’s policies were unlawful under the rule of reason,
MLB would still be harmed by the mere possibility of antitrust
litigation. This concern, presumably, flows from the idea that
revocation of the exemption would encourage antitrust lawsuits,
even ones likely to fail. This possibility, along with the high cost of
antitrust litigation, could materially and negatively affect MLB even
in the absence of an adverse judgment. This concern, however, is not
a significant one. First, most of baseball’s suspect policies are
sanctioned by its union and covered from antitrust scrutiny by the
nonstatutory labor exemption.242 Second, other professional sports
are subject to antitrust scrutiny and thus face the potential for
litigation costs.243 Finally, as illustrated in Salvino, MLB is reluc-
tant to assert its exemption when one of its policies is challenged.244
There is no evidence that this possibility affects the financial
success of either the NFL or NBA. Although MLB may periodically
face an antitrust challenge, this possibility does not pose a signifi-
cant threat to the long-term success of MLB’s business operations.
239. See Phillip Miller, The Economic Impact of Sports Stadium Construction: The Case of
Construction Industry in St. Louis, MO, 24 J. URB. AFF. 159, 159-61 (2002) (recounting
previous studies to illustrate the consensus on the impact of sports stadiums).
240. Logan E. Gans, Take Me Out to the Ball Game, but Should the Crowd’s Taxes Pay for
It?, 29 VA. TAX REV. 751, 753-54 (2010).
241. The two franchises that truly do need new stadiums are having significant difficulty
obtaining them. Both Oakland and Tampa have resisted the demands of the Athletics and
Rays, respectively. No doubt, this can be partially credited to the criticism that publicly
funded stadium projects have received from both economists and the media. See Howard
Bryant, Problem for Rays and A’s? MLB Greed, ESPN.COM (June 23, 2011), http://sports.espn.
go.com/espn/commentary/news/story?page=bryant-110622. 
242. See supra Part II.A.
243. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
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CONCLUSION 
MLB’s antitrust exemption, while important historically to pro-
tect the reserve system, has a net negative effect in today’s profes-
sional sports landscape. Although it may be foolish to unilaterally
renounce the exemption, as limiting antitrust exposure is very
important to professional sports leagues,245 it brings no clear benefit
to MLB or its business partners. MLB’s exemption is only symbolic
in nature.
In fact, the exemption actually adversely affects MLB, because it
exposes MLB’s operations to scrutiny from both Congress and the
courts.246 The mere threat of revocation seems more powerful than
the exemption itself, as MLB has chosen not to assert it for fear that
either Congress or the courts might revoke it. Application of the
exemption is also extremely unpredictable, as lower courts have
adopted completely inconsistent standards for applying antitrust
law to MLB.247 This uncertainty can and does negatively affect the
business operations of MLB. 
Still, all is not lost for professional baseball. It is clear that MLB
is nervous about life without the exemption, presumably fearful of
inconsistent treatment by the courts in cases involving baseball and
antitrust law. Yet, as this Note posits, many if not all of MLB’s prac-
tices would survive a proper rule of reason analysis, meaning that
its major policies and operations likely would be unaffected by
revocation of the antitrust exemption.248 In such an action, courts
must apply a properly broad market definition, as baseball fran-
chises compete economically with other entertainment options, not
with each other. When such factors are properly accounted for, it is
clear that the procompetitive aspects of most restraints, particularly
those as to franchise issues and the minor league, outweigh their
anticompetitive aspects. For these reasons, MLB’s antitrust exemp-
245. See Timothy Davis, What Is Sports Law?, 11 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 211, 227-29
(2001).
246. See supra Part III.B.
247. See supra Part III.A.
248. See supra Part IV.B.
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tion is actually hurting the game, rather than conferring any
tangible benefits.
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